WILL THERE BE A REAL TRANSITION
February 2002
This article analyzes the potential political transition in Burma, balancing the strength of the military regime and the opposition and other available factors related to the Burma political transition. The regime change is unlikely to take place soon, while the only potential transition would be political transformation monitored by the regime when the opposition would be willing to compromise and agree the exit guarantees for the army personal with adequate political role in the future government.
After more than a decade struggle, there has been no clue to overthrow the military government and it has been an open guess about what kind of political transition would take place in Burma. The military government's first political distraction plan, the multi-party national election of 1990, deceived and misled many of the democratic activists and supporters. The second strategy, the so-called covert dialogue has been taking place since October 2000 which also the military government's an effective political strategy to persuade the international communities and distract democratic activists from the political hot spot. There still remains unknown, how the political transition is going to take place in Burma and what kind of change would be.
The enthusiastic student activists have been dispersed throughout the world and fragmented into multiple parties and organizations and some even have become professionals. The future of the exiled government run by the 1990 MP-elects is uncertain while its political approach has been ineffective, not enough to overthrow the military government. The international community's attitude toward the Burma military govt. has been moderated by the military government's subtle way of dealing with the ethnic insurgencies, the so called "Armed Peace," and “Self Administered Zone” strategy, its covert talk with the opposition leader Daw Suu, and by its release of some political prisoners. Where is the future of Burma political transition?
Compared to the immediate student force after 1988, the strength of Burma student activists has been dispersed into many different parties and organizations around the world. Many ethnic insurgencies have been negotiated with the military government; even one of the strongest groups, Kachin Independent Organization (KIO) has been under cease-fire. The KNU faced the unusual internal faction and unpleasant fortune. There is no enough military power among armed force groups to overthrow the military govt. while international community such as the US wouldn't intervene militarily. Therefore, almost all of the armed struggles in Burma have been cracked down by the military government by one way or the other.
The importance of Burma in the Asia regional politics has been increasing especially among the Asian super powers, China, India and Japan. China, who shares similar fortune with Burma in cracking down student activists and accuse of human rights violation, seems willing to protect Burma military government if necessary. China has been economically and militarily the backbone of Burma especially after 1990 and after the collapse of the Burma Communist Movement. China's role for Burma political transition is very importance, not only as regional powerful country but also as a veto power in the UN, without the consent of China the United Nations is unlikely to be able to do anything effectively against Burma. The UN envoys and delegates' intervention will simply publicize the regime's political deals and give the regime a chance to justify its legitimacy as though it intends a real political transition from military regime government to civilian government.
India, with its internal problems in northeastern insurgencies and with fear and jealous of China's advantage in relation with Burma, has been making a positive gesture and deal with the Burma military government. Burmese and Indian soldiers have made several joint operations along the Indo-Burma border against the ethnic insurgencies in India and democratic fighters from Burma, which shows their military relationship. India has been enthusiastic in building border trade road even inside Burma through Moreh in Maipur State and Champhai in Mizoram State of India. Thus, India's contribution to the progress of Burma democratization is unlikely to weaken the regime government rather it has been militarily and economically strengthened by India's constructive engagement with the regime government.
At the same time, Japan, not willing to let Burma become China's controlled market, has been engaging with the military government with humanitarian assistance. While Thailand, traditionally inconvenient neighbor, has no much interest in Burma internal politics, except its domestic problems created by Burmese refugees in Thailand. Singapore has been one of the most supportive countries to the military government, without much concern for the Burma internal politics as a faithful neighbor in holding "the no interference to others' domestic problems and peaceful co-existence policy." Therefore, there is no enough political pressure from Asian neighboring countries that might contribute for the sooner political transition of Burma from military rule to civilian government. Not only that without the corporation of the Asian neighboring countries it is unlikely possible to give an effective pressure on the regime government by means of economic sanction.
The Asian regional organizations ASIAN, APEC and ADB are much less institutionalized and politicized than the western regional organizations such as NATO, though they embody both economic and military agreements. Their constructive dealing with the military government will only, within limited capacity, help to liberalize the military government. Therefore, within the regional context, the Burma military government has no potential threat both politically and economically without which the western pressure wouldn't able to effectively move the military government.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, being a non-violent democratic activist leader, without any public information about her covert deal with the Military government since 2000, has to liberalize her stand for a persuasive manner as the only possible way to compromise for the sake of the common cause, political transition. As public has been excluded from politics for more than 4 decades, the role of civil society for the potential political transition is negligible at this time. So that there seems no clue that the like 1988 civil disobedient is likely to take place to overthrow the military government. While unlike some countries' political transformation from military regime to civilian government, the Burma military government will not voluntarily give up political power and return to its professional barracks. Because, Burma military regime, unlike Argentina, Greece, and Panama, after four decades experience, is unlikely to collapse by itself very soon.
After having experienced the 1988 massacre, civil disobedient is unlikely to take place, though it can happen at any time, for the military government has proven its brutal oppression to any civil disobedient. Moreover, there seems no sign for fraction within the army in the near future as the internal cleansing has been taking place. The Burmese government, as one of the world's most brutal regime, in spite of its citizen’s economic starvation, will not give up power for economic reason. Therefore, it may not be wrong to say that there is no balanced political power to overthrow the military government and replace it with civil government at this time.
Generally, many countries' political transitions from dictatorship, monarchy, and military regime to civil government used to take place when there is internal collapse within the regime, balanced political power in the opposition side, and when there is international/outside intervention, while the political strength of the Burma military regime has been even better than the earlier movement since 1988. After the experience of public disapprove since 1988, like most of the world's regime governments, the current Burma military regime does not claim legitimate political role, rather it has been playing games to legitimize the military's political role based on their claim for nationalism, national peace and security. While the regime is unlikely voluntarily to give up political power and return to its professional barrack, the only potential transition is transformation in which the military regime will monitor and design the future government with exit guarantees for military personals. Otherwise, "people power" the mass mobilization of outraged citizens is necessary as the only power to forcefully demand the regime political transition.
It has been obvious to the regime that among the people of Burma, there is no ideological confusion over democracy and dictatorship. The regime has stopped to impugn Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her democratic ideology, on the other hand, it has been trying to influence the people with its nationalism, anti-colonialism, anti-westernism and with the importance of the military's historic political role in Burma politics for the peace and security of the people. The military leaders' understanding of democracy within Burmese social cultural and political context is much different from that of the western democracy. Besides power competition, there exist incompatible ideological differences between the military leaders and the opposition. Therefore, while there has been no balanced political power between the regime government and the opposition only when there is a compromise from the opposition, the regime government is likely to proceed its political transformation, not replacement, in which body both the military leaders and the opposition will share power.
This article analyzes the potential political transition in Burma, balancing the strength of the military regime and the opposition and other available factors related to the Burma political transition. The regime change is unlikely to take place soon, while the only potential transition would be political transformation monitored by the regime when the opposition would be willing to compromise and agree the exit guarantees for the army personal with adequate political role in the future government.
After more than a decade struggle, there has been no clue to overthrow the military government and it has been an open guess about what kind of political transition would take place in Burma. The military government's first political distraction plan, the multi-party national election of 1990, deceived and misled many of the democratic activists and supporters. The second strategy, the so-called covert dialogue has been taking place since October 2000 which also the military government's an effective political strategy to persuade the international communities and distract democratic activists from the political hot spot. There still remains unknown, how the political transition is going to take place in Burma and what kind of change would be.
The enthusiastic student activists have been dispersed throughout the world and fragmented into multiple parties and organizations and some even have become professionals. The future of the exiled government run by the 1990 MP-elects is uncertain while its political approach has been ineffective, not enough to overthrow the military government. The international community's attitude toward the Burma military govt. has been moderated by the military government's subtle way of dealing with the ethnic insurgencies, the so called "Armed Peace," and “Self Administered Zone” strategy, its covert talk with the opposition leader Daw Suu, and by its release of some political prisoners. Where is the future of Burma political transition?
Compared to the immediate student force after 1988, the strength of Burma student activists has been dispersed into many different parties and organizations around the world. Many ethnic insurgencies have been negotiated with the military government; even one of the strongest groups, Kachin Independent Organization (KIO) has been under cease-fire. The KNU faced the unusual internal faction and unpleasant fortune. There is no enough military power among armed force groups to overthrow the military govt. while international community such as the US wouldn't intervene militarily. Therefore, almost all of the armed struggles in Burma have been cracked down by the military government by one way or the other.
The importance of Burma in the Asia regional politics has been increasing especially among the Asian super powers, China, India and Japan. China, who shares similar fortune with Burma in cracking down student activists and accuse of human rights violation, seems willing to protect Burma military government if necessary. China has been economically and militarily the backbone of Burma especially after 1990 and after the collapse of the Burma Communist Movement. China's role for Burma political transition is very importance, not only as regional powerful country but also as a veto power in the UN, without the consent of China the United Nations is unlikely to be able to do anything effectively against Burma. The UN envoys and delegates' intervention will simply publicize the regime's political deals and give the regime a chance to justify its legitimacy as though it intends a real political transition from military regime government to civilian government.
India, with its internal problems in northeastern insurgencies and with fear and jealous of China's advantage in relation with Burma, has been making a positive gesture and deal with the Burma military government. Burmese and Indian soldiers have made several joint operations along the Indo-Burma border against the ethnic insurgencies in India and democratic fighters from Burma, which shows their military relationship. India has been enthusiastic in building border trade road even inside Burma through Moreh in Maipur State and Champhai in Mizoram State of India. Thus, India's contribution to the progress of Burma democratization is unlikely to weaken the regime government rather it has been militarily and economically strengthened by India's constructive engagement with the regime government.
At the same time, Japan, not willing to let Burma become China's controlled market, has been engaging with the military government with humanitarian assistance. While Thailand, traditionally inconvenient neighbor, has no much interest in Burma internal politics, except its domestic problems created by Burmese refugees in Thailand. Singapore has been one of the most supportive countries to the military government, without much concern for the Burma internal politics as a faithful neighbor in holding "the no interference to others' domestic problems and peaceful co-existence policy." Therefore, there is no enough political pressure from Asian neighboring countries that might contribute for the sooner political transition of Burma from military rule to civilian government. Not only that without the corporation of the Asian neighboring countries it is unlikely possible to give an effective pressure on the regime government by means of economic sanction.
The Asian regional organizations ASIAN, APEC and ADB are much less institutionalized and politicized than the western regional organizations such as NATO, though they embody both economic and military agreements. Their constructive dealing with the military government will only, within limited capacity, help to liberalize the military government. Therefore, within the regional context, the Burma military government has no potential threat both politically and economically without which the western pressure wouldn't able to effectively move the military government.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, being a non-violent democratic activist leader, without any public information about her covert deal with the Military government since 2000, has to liberalize her stand for a persuasive manner as the only possible way to compromise for the sake of the common cause, political transition. As public has been excluded from politics for more than 4 decades, the role of civil society for the potential political transition is negligible at this time. So that there seems no clue that the like 1988 civil disobedient is likely to take place to overthrow the military government. While unlike some countries' political transformation from military regime to civilian government, the Burma military government will not voluntarily give up political power and return to its professional barracks. Because, Burma military regime, unlike Argentina, Greece, and Panama, after four decades experience, is unlikely to collapse by itself very soon.
After having experienced the 1988 massacre, civil disobedient is unlikely to take place, though it can happen at any time, for the military government has proven its brutal oppression to any civil disobedient. Moreover, there seems no sign for fraction within the army in the near future as the internal cleansing has been taking place. The Burmese government, as one of the world's most brutal regime, in spite of its citizen’s economic starvation, will not give up power for economic reason. Therefore, it may not be wrong to say that there is no balanced political power to overthrow the military government and replace it with civil government at this time.
Generally, many countries' political transitions from dictatorship, monarchy, and military regime to civil government used to take place when there is internal collapse within the regime, balanced political power in the opposition side, and when there is international/outside intervention, while the political strength of the Burma military regime has been even better than the earlier movement since 1988. After the experience of public disapprove since 1988, like most of the world's regime governments, the current Burma military regime does not claim legitimate political role, rather it has been playing games to legitimize the military's political role based on their claim for nationalism, national peace and security. While the regime is unlikely voluntarily to give up political power and return to its professional barrack, the only potential transition is transformation in which the military regime will monitor and design the future government with exit guarantees for military personals. Otherwise, "people power" the mass mobilization of outraged citizens is necessary as the only power to forcefully demand the regime political transition.
It has been obvious to the regime that among the people of Burma, there is no ideological confusion over democracy and dictatorship. The regime has stopped to impugn Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her democratic ideology, on the other hand, it has been trying to influence the people with its nationalism, anti-colonialism, anti-westernism and with the importance of the military's historic political role in Burma politics for the peace and security of the people. The military leaders' understanding of democracy within Burmese social cultural and political context is much different from that of the western democracy. Besides power competition, there exist incompatible ideological differences between the military leaders and the opposition. Therefore, while there has been no balanced political power between the regime government and the opposition only when there is a compromise from the opposition, the regime government is likely to proceed its political transformation, not replacement, in which body both the military leaders and the opposition will share power.
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